G.R. No. 71393 June 28, 1989
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ELPIDIA, FELICIDAD, ISABEL, JOSE, EUGENIA, AQUILINA, CONSUELO AND NATIVIDAD, all surnamed LEYVA, and EDUARDA Vda. de LEYVA, respondents.

FACTS

The respondents, the Leyva family, are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Cainta, Rizal. Prior to the issuance of the original certificate of title in 1931, petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) erected two transmission steel towers on the property in 1929-1930. In 1973, the Leyvas filed a complaint for damages against MERALCO, alleging that the high-voltage lines rendered their property unusable and dangerous. MERALCO claimed it had acquired a perpetual easement of right-of-way by virtue of a grant from the original owner, Nazario Crisostomo, for which it paid $12.40, and alternatively, that it had acquired the easement by prescription or that the action was barred by laches.
MERALCO failed to present the original written grant. Instead, it offered the deposition of a retired field auditor, Leland Gardner, as secondary evidence of the lost document to prove the contract and payment. The trial court ruled in favor of the Leyvas, awarding temperate damages, annual compensation, attorney’s fees, and costs. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether MERALCO validly acquired a perpetual easement of right-of-way over the Leyvas’ property, either by title (contract) or by prescription.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. MERALCO did not acquire the easement by title. The Court upheld the rejection of the Gardner deposition as inadmissible secondary evidence. Before secondary evidence can be introduced, the proponent must prove the former existence and due execution of the original document. MERALCO failed to lay this necessary predicate. Gardner’s testimony indicated the grants were likely not public instruments and were mere written statements, and he provided no competent evidence to establish the original document’s execution or authenticity.
Furthermore, MERALCO did not acquire the easement by prescription. For prescription to run, possession must be under a claim of title (en concepto de dueño) or adverse. The Court found MERALCO’s possession was by mere tolerance of the owners. This was evidenced by the Leyvas’ post-war complaints, MERALCO’s own negotiations to purchase the land in 1968, and the eventual filing of the lawsuit after a demand for compensation was refused. Possession by tolerance does not ripen into a prescriptive right. Consequently, the Leyvas’ cause of action was not barred by prescription or laches.
Since MERALCO had no lawful easement, its continuous use of the property for its towers constituted an impairment of the Leyvas’ ownership rights. The awards for temperate damages and annual compensation were justified as the high-voltage lines effectively made the land off-limits, depriving the owners of its use and profit while they remained liable for taxes. The award of attorney’s fees was also proper.