G.R. No. L-47646 September 19, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HON. CESAR R. MARAVILLA and MANUEL B. GADON alias “EDRING”, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On April 29, 1977, Remy G. Gomboc accused Manuel B. Gadon of grabbing her left breast. On May 10, 1977, she filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness in the municipal court of San Andres, Romblon. In the municipal judge’s absence, the mayor conducted a preliminary investigation, issued a warrant, and set bail, which Gadon posted. On July 1, 1977, the municipal judge, respondent Cesar R. Maravilla, dismissed this case, annulling the mayor’s proceedings for failing to ask “searching questions.” Gomboc re-filed the acts of lasciviousness charge on July 13, 1977.
After a preliminary investigation, Judge Maravilla found no prima facie case for acts of lasciviousness on July 19, 1977, and directed the prosecution to file the proper charge. Consequently, on July 21, 1977, a complaint for unjust vexation was filed. Gadon pleaded not guilty and moved to quash, arguing the crime had prescribed, as the 60-day prescriptive period for unjust vexation had allegedly lapsed from April 29 to July 21. Judge Maravilla granted the motion and dismissed the case, prompting the People’s petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Did the filing of the initial complaint for acts of lasciviousness interrupt the prescriptive period for the subsequently filed charge of unjust vexation, thereby preventing the crime from prescribing?

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the dismissal orders, and remanded the case for trial. The Court held that the crime of unjust vexation had not prescribed. The legal logic centers on the computation of prescription under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information. The Court rejected the defense’s argument that the period ran uninterrupted from April 29 to July 21, 1977, because the earlier proceedings dealt with a different crime.
The Court ruled that the initial filing of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness with the municipal mayor on May 10, 1977, validly interrupted the prescriptive period. The mayor’s authority to act in the judge’s temporary absence under the then Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court made that filing an effective judicial step. Following precedents like People vs. Olarte, the filing of a complaint for preliminary investigation interrupts prescription, regardless of the court’s capacity to try the case on the merits. Furthermore, the facts alleged in the initial complaint essentially described the act of unjust vexation. A misdesignation of the crime in the caption does not vitiate the information if the facts constitute an offense; the facts control. Thus, the period ran only from April 29 to May 10 (11 days), was interrupted until dismissal on July 1, ran from July 1 to July 13 (12 days), was interrupted until July 19, and ran for 2 days until the filing on July 21. In total, only 25 days of the 60-day period had elapsed, so the action was not time-barred.