G.R. No. 59241 -44 July 5, 1989
PEDRO TANDOC, ROGELIO ERCELLA, RUDY DIAZ, JUAN ROSARIO, AND FRED MENOR, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE RICARDO P. RESULTAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), ARNULFO PAYOPAY, MANUEL CANCINO, and CONRADO PAYOPAY, SR., respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from two sets of interrelated criminal complaints stemming from an altercation on October 19, 1980. The first complaint (I.S. No. 80-198) was filed by the group of Pacita Tandoc against Arnulfo Payopay and others for Trespass to Dwelling, Serious Physical Injuries, and Slight Physical Injuries. The City Fiscal found probable cause and filed the corresponding Informations in court. Subsequently, the Payopay group filed a counter-complaint (I.S. No. 80-233) against Pedro Tandoc and others. The City Fiscal dismissed most charges as mere countercharges but found prima facie evidence for Trespass to Dwelling by Pedro Tandoc, leading to the filing of an Information.
Unsatisfied, the Payopay group later filed four new criminal complaints directly with the City Court of San Carlos City against petitioners Pedro Tandoc, et al., for Serious Physical Injuries, Trespass to Dwelling, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Grave Threats. The City Judge, after conducting a preliminary examination, found reasonable ground to believe the offenses were committed and that petitioners were probably guilty, issuing orders for their arrest. Petitioners moved for a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, which the judge denied.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for a re-investigation by the Office of the City Fiscal after the judge had already found probable cause in a preliminary examination for offenses within the court’s jurisdiction.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the jurisdiction and procedure governing preliminary investigations for cases cognizable by inferior courts. The offenses charged—Trespass to Dwelling, Serious and Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Grave Threats—are all within the original jurisdiction of the then City Court (equivalent to Municipal Trial Courts). Under the applicable rules, for cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts and filed directly with them, the judge is mandated to personally examine the complainant and witnesses under oath. If the judge finds sufficient grounds, he shall issue a warrant of arrest; the case proceeds for trial on the merits.
The Court clarified that a re-investigation by the fiscal is not a matter of right in such instances. The authority of the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation is generally for cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Once the inferior court has acquired jurisdiction and has found probable cause after its own preliminary examination, the fiscal’s role is superseded. To allow a re-investigation would be an encroachment on the court’s jurisdiction and would cause undue delay. The petitioners’ remedy was not to seek a re-investigation but to proceed to trial and present their defense. The Court found that the respondent judge correctly performed his duty under the rules and that his denial of the motion for re-investigation was legally sound.