G.R. No. L-49344 February 23, 1989
ARISTOTELES REYNOSO and/or NAPOLEON B. REYNOSO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROTACIO ORAP, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Aristoteles and Napoleon Reynoso filed an accion publiciana to recover possession of a 56-hectare parcel of land in Albay. Their claim was based on a series of sales of possessory rights originating from Feliciano Hatol, who possessed the land prior to 1943, culminating in a sale to Aristoteles Reynoso in 1964. Napoleon Reynoso had a pending sales application with the Bureau of Lands. They alleged that they and their predecessors had introduced improvements and received shares from croppers. Private respondent Protacio Orap entered the land in 1962, claiming rights derived from a different source (Eligio Nunez/Atty. Rizalino Reynoso) and under a pasture lease application. He fenced the land and introduced cattle, dispossessing the petitioners’ tenants.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring Aristoteles Reynoso the lawful possessor, ordering Orap to restore possession, and awarding damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the complaint. It held that since both parties were mere applicants for public land (one for sale, one for lease) and their applications were pending, neither had a right to possession that could be enforced in court. It further reasoned that the land’s classification as forest or agricultural was a matter for executive determination, beyond judicial authority.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the accion publiciana despite both parties being applicants for public land, and whether it could determine possession and classify the land as agricultural.

RULING

Yes, the trial court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s decision. The Court clarified that an accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession, and jurisdiction is vested in the proper regional trial court irrespective of the nature of the property involved. The pendency of public land applications does not strip the courts of jurisdiction to determine who has a better right of possession (jus possessionis). Citing Mediran v. Villanueva, the Court held that the purpose of such an action is precisely to determine who has prior possession de facto, not to resolve questions of ownership or to adjudicate title to public land, which remains the exclusive prerogative of the Director of Lands.
The Court found that the petitioners, through their predecessors, had established prior physical possession dating back to before 1943, which was disturbed by Orap’s entry in 1962. This prior possession is protected by law and can be the subject of a possessory action. The defense of good faith claimed by Orap was unavailing because petitioners immediately objected to his entry. Furthermore, the trial court did not improperly classify the land. Evidence from the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry showed the land was officially classified as public agricultural land; the court merely acknowledged this administrative fact. Even absent such evidence, a presumption exists that lands are agricultural. Since the land was agricultural, it fell under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, not the Bureau of Forestry, further undermining Orap’s claim under a pasture lease.