G.R. No. 78595 April 10, 1989
TIMOTEO MAGNO, petitioner, vs. FLORENTINA BLANCO and SESINANDO ACOSTA and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Timoteo Magno was the agricultural lessee of land owned by respondents spouses Florentina Blanco and Sesinando Acosta. In CAR Case No. 2121-P’71, the parties entered into a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) on August 6, 1971, wherein Magno agreed to pay an annual rental of 20 cavans of palay. Magno later defaulted on these rentals. To recover the unpaid palay, estimated at 66.75 cavans, the respondents filed a motion for an alias writ of execution in the same CAR case. The CAR granted the motion. The sheriff levied on two parcels of land owned by Magno, sold them at public auction to respondent Acosta, and the sale was annotated on the titles.
Magno refused to surrender the lands, prompting respondents to file an action for recovery of ownership and possession in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC dismissed the complaint, declaring the sheriff’s sale null and void. It ruled that the CAR decision, which only ordered payment in cavans of palay without specifying a monetary value, was incomplete and not final for execution. The RTC held that the sheriff had no authority to fix the price, a matter requiring judicial discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, reinstating the validity of the execution and sale.

ISSUE

Whether the alias writ of execution issued in CAR Case No. 2121-P’71, and the subsequent levy and sale of Magno’s properties, were valid.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC decision, declaring the alias writ of execution and all proceedings pursuant thereto null and void. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of a writ of execution and the requirements of due process. A writ of execution must conform strictly to the judgment it seeks to enforce. The compromise judgment in CAR Case No. 2121-P’71 only ordered payment of a specific quantity of palay (20 cavans annually). It did not adjudicate a specific liquidated money judgment, as it did not fix the monetary value of the palay. Therefore, the judgment was not final and executory for a sum of money. The sheriff, in converting the palay debt into a monetary value for the levy, exercised a judicial function he did not possess. This rendered the writ of execution invalid, as it was not warranted by the terms of the judgment.
Furthermore, the ex-parte application for the writ deprived Magno of due process, a critical lapse given the severe consequences. Under P.D. No. 816, a lessee’s deliberate refusal to pay rentals for two years could result in forfeiture of the landholding, a penalty requiring a full hearing. The proper remedy for collecting unpaid rentals with an unliquidated value was a separate judicial action, not an execution on an incomplete judgment. Since the alias writ was void, all subsequent acts—the levy, auction sale, and annotations—were also void and of no legal effect.