GR 74817; (November, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 74817 November 8, 1989
SIMEON ESTOESTA SR. and LUCIA ESTOESTA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXIII; QUEZON CITY SHERIFF and his Deputy Sheriff JUANITO B. LINDO; TRINIDAD ESTOESTA and LUIS VILLAMOR, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Simeon and Lucia Estoesta filed an action to annul a sale of a house and lot made by their daughter, respondent Trinidad Estoesta, in favor of respondent Luis Villamor. They alleged they were the original awardees from the PHHC, transferred rights to Trinidad for convenience, and later had her execute a deed of sale back to them. However, Trinidad subsequently sold the property to Villamor. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring the sale to Villamor null and void, ordering the cancellation of his title, and issuing a new title in the petitioners’ names. Villamor appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
The IAC reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The IAC granted this motion, set aside its reversal, and reinstated the trial court’s decision. Villamor then filed a second motion for reconsideration with the IAC. The IAC granted this second motion, setting aside its own order of reinstatement and affirming its initial decision of reversal. This second grant of a motion for reconsideration by the IAC is the central procedural flaw.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC) decision, having been rendered after granting a second motion for reconsideration in violation of its own rules, is valid and can be the basis for the execution of judgment.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the IAC decision is null and void. The legal logic is anchored on the principle of finality of judgments and the explicit prohibition against second motions for reconsideration. Under the IAC’s Internal Rules, only one motion for reconsideration is allowed. By entertaining and granting Villamor’s second motion for reconsideration, the IAC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void; it confers no rights and imposes no duties. Being void, it is deemed legally non-existent. Consequently, all proceedings founded upon it, including the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce that void appellate decision, are equally void and of no effect. A void judgment is subject to collateral attack, as in this petition, and cannot be the source of any valid right or enforceable order. Therefore, the trial court’s orders issuing the writ were set aside, and the trial court was directed to execute its original valid decision in favor of the petitioners.
