G.R. No. 75041 November 13, 1989
Rosa N. Edra, Mercy Edra, Winmelyn Edra, and Jerico Edra, represented by their mother Rosa N. Edra, petitioners, vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Marcelino T. Sadumiano alias Mario T. Sadremiano and Pepito N. Zambrana, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners, Rosa N. Edra and her minor children, filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Marcelino T. Sadumiano (jeepney operator) and Pepito Zambrana (driver) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint arose from a vehicular accident in Bauang, La Union, where the jeepney the petitioners hired rolled off the road, causing them serious injuries. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served at the addresses of the private respondents through Teofila Sadremiano. The respondents failed to file their answers within the reglementary period. Consequently, the trial court declared them in default, allowed ex parte presentation of evidence, and subsequently rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to pay the petitioners actual expenses, moral damages, and attorney’s fees.
Private respondent Zambrana later filed a motion to lift the order of default and set aside the decision, claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, alleging the recipient Teofila Sadremiano was non-existent. The trial court denied this motion, ruling it was without merit, and issued a writ of execution as the judgment had become final and executory. Subsequently, private respondent Sadumiano filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), which granted the petition, set aside the trial court’s decision, and ordered a new trial, primarily on the grounds of alleged improper service of summons.

ISSUE

Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in annulling the trial court’s final and executory judgment based on a petition for certiorari that challenged the jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the trial court’s decision had long become final and executory. The records showed that Sadumiano had received a copy of the decision on March 6, 1982. From that date, he had the opportunity to appeal but chose not to do so. Consequently, by operation of law, the judgment became final and executory on April 5, 1982. A final and executory judgment can no longer be annulled or modified, as the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that litigation must end at some definite date.
The Court emphasized that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The private respondent’s recourse to certiorari in February 1986, nearly four years after the judgment attained finality, was improper. The alleged defect in the service of summons, even if true, was deemed waived by the respondents’ failure to timely challenge it and by their subsequent acts which constituted voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the pleadings filed by the private respondent’s counsel were merely dilatory tactics intended to frustrate the execution of a valid judgment. The trial court’s proceedings were regular, and the ex parte reception of evidence was solely attributable to the respondents’ own fault in not filing their answer. Thus, the IAC was deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court’s final judgment.