G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989
Joel B. Caes, petitioner, vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Hon. Alfredo M. Gorgonio, and People of the Philippines, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Joel Caes was charged with illegal possession of firearms and marijuana in 1981. After his arraignment in August 1982, the trial was repeatedly postponed over the next year, primarily due to the repeated absence of prosecution witnesses or the lack of a trial fiscal. On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases due to its witnesses’ non-appearance. The trial court granted the motion, noting the conformity of the accused, and ordered the cases provisionally dismissed.
In January 1984, the prosecution witnesses themselves, not the government prosecutor, filed a motion to revive the cases, alleging they lacked notice of the November 1983 hearing. Copy was furnished to the City Fiscal but not to the petitioner. The respondent judge granted the motion ex parte in May 1984. Caes moved for reconsideration, arguing the revival placed him in double jeopardy, but this was denied. After the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed his petition, Caes elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the motion for revival filed by the prosecution witnesses was valid; and (2) whether the revival of the provisionally dismissed cases would place the petitioner in double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling in favor of the petitioner on both counts. On the first issue, the Court held that the motion for revival was invalid. The prosecution of a criminal case is solely under the control and responsibility of the government prosecutor. The complaining witnesses have no legal personality to move for the dismissal or revival of a case; their role is limited to testifying. The fact that the prosecutor was furnished a copy but did not object was insufficient to validate the motion, especially since the petitioner was not notified. The trial judge should have summarily dismissed the motion.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the revival constituted double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: a valid indictment, a court of competent jurisdiction, a valid arraignment and plea, and a dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused. The Court found that all these elements were present. The dismissal, though labeled “provisional,” was in fact indefinite and made without the petitioner’s express consent. His mere failure to object to the prosecution’s motion for provisional dismissal did not equate to express consent. Consequently, the dismissal became final, and any further prosecution for the same offense was barred. The Court emphasized the prosecution’s negligence and ineptitude, which led to the violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial and against double jeopardy. The dismissal was declared final.