GR 74431; (November, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil, petitioners, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, David Uy and Teresita Uy, respondents.
FACTS
On July 29, 1975, three-year-old Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog named “Andoy” while playing in a house on F. Ramos Street, Cebu City. She was hospitalized for lacerated wounds, administered an anti-rabies vaccine, and discharged after nine days. She was readmitted a week later due to “vomiting of saliva” and died the following day. The death certificate listed the cause as broncho-pneumonia. The child’s parents, the Uys, sued the Vestils for damages, alleging they were the possessors of the dog. The Vestils denied ownership and possession, claiming the dog and house belonged to the estate of Purita’s late father, Vicente Miranda, and that no one witnessed the dog bite the child. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court, finding the Vestils liable as possessors under Article 2183 of the Civil Code and establishing that the child’s death resulted from the dog bite. It ordered the Vestils to pay damages. The Vestils appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing they were not possessors and that the certified cause of death (broncho-pneumonia) was independent of the dog bite.
ISSUE
The core issues were: (1) Whether the petitioners were the legal possessors of the dog at the time of the incident; and (2) Whether the dog bite was the proximate cause of the child’s death.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision with modification on the amount of medical expenses. On possession, the Court ruled that liability under Article 2183 attaches to the possessor of an animal, not necessarily the owner. The evidence demonstrated that Purita Vestil, as the only heir residing in Cebu City, was the de facto possessor and administrator of her father’s house where the dog stayed. She and her family used the house regularly, maintained boarders there for business, hired a maid for its upkeep, and applied for its water connection. This control over the premises constituted possession of the dog residing therein, regardless of the unsettled estate.
On causation, the Court held that the death certificate stating broncho-pneumonia was not conclusive proof. Testimony established the child developed hydrophobia (fear of water), a classic symptom of rabies, following the bite. Medical explanation indicated that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia was a complication of rabies. Thus, a causal link between the dog bite and the death was sufficiently proven. The defenses that the dog was tame or provoked were unavailing, as Article 2183 imposes strict liability based on social interest and natural equity, covering even tame animals, and a three-year-old child cannot be guilty of provocation. The possessor is liable even if the animal escapes or is lost. The awards were upheld, except medical expenses were reduced to the amount pleaded.
