G.R. No. L-59581. December 29, 1989.
TARCISIO ICAO, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMPLICIO M. APALISOK, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga del Norte, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Tarcisio Icao, a provincial guard, was convicted of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. The judgment, promulgated on October 12, 1981, sentenced him to four months and one day of arresto mayor, maximum, with the accessory penalty of temporary special disqualification. Icao did not appeal. Instead, on the same day, he filed a petition for probation under the Probation Law of 1976 and was released on his own recognizance.
On November 12, 1981, the trial judge, respondent Simplicio M. Apalisok, issued an order amending the judgment to specify the duration of the temporary special disqualification as eight years and one day. The judge reasoned that allowing Icao to continue serving as a provincial guard, the very position involved in his conviction, would flout the law. The court scheduled the promulgation of this amended decision. Icao moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court had lost jurisdiction as the judgment had become final and that the amendment would place him in double jeopardy. The motions were denied.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to amend its final judgment of conviction by specifying the duration of an accessory penalty after the accused had filed a petition for probation and the period for appeal had lapsed.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court annulled the trial court’s orders, ruling it had lost jurisdiction to modify the judgment. Under Section 7, Rule 120 of the 1964 Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction may only be modified before it becomes final or before an appeal is perfected. A judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, when the sentence is served or satisfied, or when the right to appeal is expressly waived. Here, the fifteen-day period to appeal from the October 12, 1981 promulgation lapsed without an appeal being taken by Icao. Consequently, the judgment became final and executory on October 28, 1981. The filing of the probation petition did not alter this finality for the purpose of the court’s power to amend the substantive judgment. A final and executory judgment can no longer be amended or corrected, except for clerical errors. This rule is of long standing and undeviating observance. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve whether the probation application itself constituted a waiver of appeal, as the lapse of the appeal period alone sufficed to establish finality. Furthermore, the Court noted that under Article 44 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of arresto carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence, implying courts lack the power to fix a longer term for such accessory disqualification.