G.R. No. 55854 February 23, 1990
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, petitioners, vs. Hon. Otilio G. Abaya, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Agusan del Sur, Renato N. Aquino, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents filed separate applications for land registration covering parcels in Agusan del Sur. The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development, through the Solicitor General, filed oppositions. The Solicitor General formally entered his appearance via a notice specifying that while the Provincial Fiscal was authorized to appear and receive notices, the Solicitor General retained supervision and control. The notice explicitly stated that “only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party represented.”
After trial, the court rendered a decision adjudicating the lands to the applicants. The Provincial Fiscal received a copy on June 17, 1980. The Solicitor General received his copy on July 8, 1980. On July 29, 1980, the government, through the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file the record on appeal. The trial court denied the appeal, ruling that notice to the Fiscal on June 17 bound the government, making the July 29 notice filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period from June 17.

ISSUE

Whether the period to appeal should be reckoned from the notice to the Provincial Fiscal or from the notice to the Solicitor General.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the trial court’s order. The period to appeal must be reckoned from the Solicitor General’s receipt of the decision. The legal logic is anchored on the Solicitor General’s statutory mandate and the specific terms of his appearance. By express provision of law (P.D. No. 478), the Solicitor General is the counsel of the government in all land registration cases. His notice of appearance clearly established that he was the counsel of record, retaining supervision and control over the case, and that only service on him would bind the government. The Provincial Fiscal acted merely as a surrogate or local agent under the Solicitor General’s direction.
The Court cited the precedent in Republic vs. Polo, which held that service on a fiscal does not constitute service on the Solicitor General under such circumstances. Since the Solicitor General received the decision on July 8, 1980, and filed the notice of appeal on July 29, 1980, the appeal was timely filed within the 30-day reglementary period. The subsequent motions for extension and the filing of the records on appeal were also done within the granted extensions. Therefore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the appeal, and it was directed to give due course to it.