GR L 31665; (August 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975
LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON. GREGORIO PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Leonardo Almeda was charged with qualified theft. The court set his bail at P15,000 but directed it be posted entirely in cash. Almeda requested to post a surety bond instead, but the trial court denied this motion, citing allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism in an amended information. At the same hearing, the City Fiscal moved orally to amend the information to include these allegations. Almeda objected, arguing the amendment was premature, should be in writing, and would place him in double jeopardy as he had already pleaded not guilty. The court granted the oral motion, and the fiscal annotated the amendment on the back of the original information. Almeda’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was denied, prompting this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
The issues are: (1) whether the respondent judge could require a strictly cash bond and disallow a surety bond, and (2) whether the amendment to the information after a plea of not guilty was proper in substance and procedure.
RULING
On the first issue, the Court ruled the respondent judge erred in requiring a strictly cash bond. The constitutional right to bail means bail must not be excessive. While the amount was reasonable, demanding it solely in cash could be excessive, as it requires an actual financial outlay from the accused, unlike a surety bond which involves only a premium. This could effectively deny the right to bail. The Rules allow an accused the option to deposit cash instead of giving a surety bond, but this option belongs to the accused, not the court. The court cannot reject acceptable sureties and insist on cash. However, given Almeda’s criminal record, the trial court may increase the bail amount or impose other reasonable conditions to ensure his appearance.
On the second issue, the amendment was procedurally flawed but substantively permissible. A motion to amend an information after plea should be in writing under the Rules of Court. The oral amendment shortcut was improper. However, the amendment itself, which alleged recidivism and habitual delinquency, did not charge a new offense but only affected the penalty. Such amendments are allowed even after plea as they do not prejudice the accused’s substantive rights or place him in double jeopardy. Since Almeda was given oral notice and an opportunity to object, the Court refrained from nullifying the amendment. The order denying the surety bond was set aside, but the amendment was sustained.
