G.R. No. L-25600 September 30, 1975
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RICARDO C. PUNO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and ALFREDO R. GOMEZ, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Alfredo R. Gomez filed a criminal complaint on November 2, 1965, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, charging petitioner Herminio A. Astorga with election offenses under the Revised Election Code, allegedly committed during the November 12, 1963 elections. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 80557. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription, arguing that more than two years had elapsed since the alleged commission of the offenses without a formal information being filed. The respondent judge denied the motion, ruling that the filing of the complaint with the CFI itself interrupted the prescriptive period.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, raising additional grounds: that the proceedings should be suspended due to a prejudicial question in a pending election protest between the same parties involving the same acts, and that the CFI lacked jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation, as such power allegedly belonged exclusively to the City Fiscal of Manila under the city charter. The respondent judge denied this motion as well. Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the court’s orders.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the CFI of Manila had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of the election offense complaint; (2) whether the filing of the criminal complaint before the CFI interrupted the two-year prescriptive period for election offenses; and (3) whether the criminal proceedings should be suspended pending resolution of a prejudicial question in a related election protest case.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the challenged orders. On jurisdiction, the Court ruled that Section 187 of the Revised Election Code expressly grants the Court of First Instance the authority to conduct preliminary investigations of election offenses. This specific statutory grant prevails over the general provisions of the Manila City Charter cited by the petitioner. The CFI, therefore, acted within its jurisdiction.
On prescription, the Court applied the ruling in David vs. Santos, holding that the filing of a complaint for violation of the Election Code with the CFI, which has exclusive jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation, properly interrupts the period of prescription. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that prescription is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information, is applied suppletorily to the Election Code. Thus, the complaint filed on November 2, 1965, tolled the two-year period that commenced on November 12, 1963.
Regarding the prejudicial question, the Court found the suspension of the criminal case to be premature. Citing Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and the precedent in Dasalla vs. City Attorney of Quezon City, the proper time to invoke a prejudicial question is after the fiscal has filed the corresponding information in court, not during the preliminary investigation stage. Consequently, the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions to dismiss or suspend the proceedings. The temporary restraining order was lifted.