G.R. No. 48324 March 14, 1990
JOSE AGRAVANTE and JUAN AGRAVANTE, petitioners, vs. JUANA PATRIARCA, substituted by Rosita Ordoñez, and HON. ALFREDO REBUENO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, respondents.

FACTS

In 1969, Juana Patriarca Peña filed an action to quiet title against Jose and Juan Agravante. After the case records were destroyed in a 1976 fire and subsequently reconstituted, the court set a pre-trial for February 27, 1978. The defendants’ counsel, Atty. Gil Pacamarra, filed a motion for postponement dated February 14, 1978, citing illness (headache) supported by a photocopied medical certificate. This motion lacked a notice of hearing. The trial court denied the motion, noting the procedural defects and observing that the counsel had ample time to rest before the scheduled hearing. Despite notice of this denial served on February 24, 1978, neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared at the February 27 pre-trial. Consequently, the court declared the defendants in default and allowed the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Subsequently, the plaintiff died, and her heirs were substituted. The defendants moved for reconsideration of the orders denying postponement, declaring default, and allowing substitution, but these were denied. The petitioners then filed this certiorari petition, arguing they were denied their day in court. They contended the motion’s defect was merely formal, that pre-trial notice should have been personally served on them, that the court lost jurisdiction upon the plaintiff’s death before the ex parte order, and that they were deprived of an opportunity to oppose the substitution.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement and subsequently declaring the defendants in default.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The omission of a notice of hearing in the motion for postponement was not a mere formal defect but a fatal procedural flaw. Under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, a motion must contain a notice of hearing specifying the date for its consideration, served on all parties at least three days in advance. This requirement is mandatory to afford the adverse party an opportunity to oppose the motion. The Court emphasized that no party has a right to a postponement; it is a matter addressed to the court’s sound discretion.
The supporting medical certificate, being an unverified photocopy, was insufficient. It merely recommended rest and did not establish that the counsel’s illness was so severe as to excuse his non-attendance at a hearing set a month later. The trial court correctly observed that the counsel had sufficient time to recover. Furthermore, notice of the denial was duly served on counsel three days before the pre-trial, yet he still failed to appear. The petitioners’ other contentions were also without merit. Notice of pre-trial to counsel is deemed notice to the party. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff was acquired upon the filing of the complaint and was not lost by her subsequent death, as the action for quiet title survives and allows for substitution of heirs. The proper remedy from the order of default was a verified motion under Rule 38 to set aside the judgment, which the petitioners did not avail. The Court concluded that the petitioners’ actions indicated a desire to delay the proceedings, and the trial court acted within its discretion in proceeding with the case.