G.R. Nos. L-49241-42; April 27, 1990
RINCONADA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, IRIGA TELEPHONE COMPANY INC. and FRANCISCO IMPERIAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Rinconada Telephone Company purchased a certificate of public convenience from respondent Francisco Imperial to operate a telephone service in Iriga City. Subsequently, Imperial sold the same certificate to respondent Iriga Telephone Company, Inc. (ITELCO). Petitioner filed civil actions for breach of contract and annulment of the second sale before the Iriga City court, presided by respondent Judge Buenviaje. Petitioner was initially represented by Atty. Luciano Maggay. After the trial court dismissed the civil cases based on res judicata, petitioner, through a new counsel, Atty. Benjamin Santos, filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondent judge, recognizing Atty. Santos, sent him a copy of the order submitting the motion for resolution. However, when the motion was denied, the denial order was sent only to the original counsel of record, Atty. Maggay, and not to Atty. Santos. Consequently, petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period, and the respondent judge denied the appeal for being tardy.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s right to appeal due to the late filing of the notice of appeal, which tardiness resulted from the court’s failure to serve the denial order on the new counsel who had entered his appearance.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic centers on the court’s inconsistent application of procedural rules regarding counsel of record and the service of court processes. While it is a general rule that notice must be served upon the counsel of record at his given address, and Atty. Maggay remained the counsel of record due to the lack of a formal substitution, the respondent judge’s own actions created an exception. By sending the order submitting the motion for reconsideration to Atty. Santos and considering his motion, the judge effectively acknowledged him as the active counsel for petitioner. This recognition logically imposed a duty on the court to also serve the subsequent denial order upon Atty. Santos to ensure he could advise his client on the next procedural steps, including a timely appeal. The court’s sudden reversion to the technical rule, serving the denial only on Atty. Maggay after having dealt with Atty. Santos on the same motion, was whimsical and capricious. This inconsistent posture directly caused the delay in filing the appeal. Procedural rules are tools to secure substantial justice, not to defeat it. In meritorious cases, a liberal interpretation is imperative to protect a party’s substantive rights. Dismissing appeals purely on technicalities, especially when the court’s own action contributed to the procedural lapse, is frowned upon. Therefore, the denial of the appeal constituted grave abuse of discretion, and petitioner must be allowed to appeal.