G.R. No. 187298; July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, ET AL., Respondents.

FACTS

On January 15, 2009, three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workers were kidnapped in Patikul, Sulu, by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). In response, respondent Governor Abdusakur M. Tan organized a Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) through a “secret” Memorandum of Understanding with the AFP and PNP. Following a demand from the ASG for military withdrawal and threats to behead a hostage, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in Sulu. The proclamation, citing the Human Security Act and the Local Government Code, called upon the PNP, AFP, and the CEF to implement checkpoints, curfews, general search and seizures, arrests, and other actions to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, including a police officer and local residents, filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the Supreme Court. They challenged the validity of Proclamation No. 1-09, arguing it constituted an invalid exercise of emergency powers, unlawfully delegated police powers to the CEF, and authorized violations of constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. They sought to nullify the proclamation and enjoin its implementation, claiming it created a regime of warrantless arrests and searches.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether Governor Tan, as a local chief executive, validly exercised emergency powers by issuing Proclamation No. 1-09, which declared a state of emergency and authorized warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures in the province of Sulu.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and declared Proclamation No. 1-09 NULL and VOID. The Court held that the power to declare a “state of emergency” and exercise extraordinary powers in times of invasion, rebellion, or public danger is a national power vested solely in the President under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution. A provincial governor possesses no such inherent or statutory authority. While Section 465 of the Local Government Code grants governors powers to carry out emergency measures during disasters and call upon law enforcement, this does not equate to the President’s constitutional emergency power. The governor’s role is limited to implementing measures in coordination with national agencies, not unilaterally suspending or authorizing the disregard of constitutional rights.
The proclamation’s specific directives for “general search and seizure including arrests” were constitutionally infirm. They effectively sanctioned a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law, powers reserved to the President and Congress. The creation and arming of the CEF, a civilian group, to perform law enforcement functions alongside the PNP and AFP also raised grave concerns about the principle of civilian supremacy and the rule of law. The Court emphasized that even in emergencies, the Constitution and laws must be followed, and the declaration of a state of emergency by a local executive cannot justify the suspension of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The proclamation was an ultra vires act beyond the legal authority of a provincial governor.