GR 41863 1997 (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41863. April 22, 1977.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASST. PROVINCIAL FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR., respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. was initially charged with slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 3335) before the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo, for an incident occurring on April 12, 1975. The information, filed on April 15, 1975, alleged that the injuries inflicted upon Miguel Viajar would require medical attendance for 5 to 9 days, barring complications. Fama, Jr. pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, on June 8, 1975, Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal charging serious physical injuries arising from the same incident. After investigation, an information for serious physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 5241) was filed in the Court of First Instance on July 28, 1975, alleging the injuries left “a permanent scar and deforming on the right face” of Viajar.
Fama, Jr. moved to dismiss Case No. 5241 on grounds of double jeopardy. Meanwhile, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the first case (No. 3335), but the municipal court, instead of acting on the motion, dismissed it on September 11, 1975, due to the prosecution’s repeated postponements, which the court deemed a violation of the accused’s right to a speedy trial. Relying on this dismissal, the Court of First Instance, in its orders dated September 22 and October 14, 1975, sustained the double jeopardy plea and dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.
ISSUE
Whether the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 3335 for slight physical injuries bars the subsequent prosecution for serious physical injuries (Case No. 5241) on the ground of double jeopardy.
RULING
No, double jeopardy does not attach. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the respondent judge’s orders. The legal logic hinges on the existence of a supervening fact. The rule on identity of offenses, which underpins a double jeopardy claim, does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. Here, the initial charge for slight physical injuries was based on a medical certificate issued merely three days after the incident, indicating only the healing period. The subsequent information for serious physical injuries contained the crucial additional allegation of a permanent scar and deformity. This deformity, not apparent or discernible at the time of the initial filing and medical examination, constitutes a supervening fact that altered the character of the crime. The Court distinguished the controlling precedent from People vs. Silva, where all facts were known from the outset, and instead applied Melo vs. People and People vs. Buling, which hold that a new fact supervening after the first prosecution gives rise to a new and distinct offense. Since the alleged deformity could not have been determined with certainty when the first case was filed, the plea of double jeopardy could not be sustained. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case, and the Court of First Instance was ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 5241.
