G.R. No. L-23749. April 29, 1977.
FAUSTINO CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. J. M. TUASON & COMPANY, INC., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Faustino Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of improvements made on land and to compel conveyance of 3,000 square meters. He alleged two causes of action. First, he claimed that upon the request of the Deudor family, who asserted a claim to the land via an “informacion posesoria,” he made permanent improvements valued at over P38,000 on a 20-quinone parcel. Since defendants-appellees (the registered owners) now benefit from these improvements, he sought reimbursement under the principle of unjust enrichment. Second, he alleged that in 1952, defendants availed of his services as an intermediary to settle a land case with the Deudors. He performed, resulting in a 1963 court-approved compromise. In consideration, defendants allegedly promised to convey to him 3,000 square meters of the land within ten years from the agreement’s signing, which promise they refused to honor.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss on three grounds: (1) failure to state a cause of action for improvements, as the agreement was with the Deudors, not them; (2) unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds for the alleged promise to convey land, it being oral; and (3) prescription of the action to compel conveyance. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE
The core issues were whether the complaint stated a cause of action for reimbursement of improvements based on unjust enrichment; whether the oral promise to convey land was enforceable; and whether the action had prescribed.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, but on a distinct procedural ground that rendered the substantive issues moot. The Court found that appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s dismissal order was merely pro-forma, as it reiterated arguments already presented and resolved in his prior oppositions. Consequently, the motion did not toll or suspend the reglementary period to appeal.
The trial court’s order of dismissal was dated August 13, 1964. The appeal was filed on September 24, 1964, which was 42 days later, exceeding the 30-day period prescribed by law. Therefore, the dismissal order had already become final and executory when the appeal was taken. The Court dismissed the appeal on this jurisdictional ground, stating it could consider this unassigned error as it was within the frame of the issues below and affected the court’s authority to entertain the appeal.
While the Court discussed the substantive merits in its decision, noting that the claim for improvements could not prosper under Article 2142 on quasi-contract because the defendants’ enrichment was not at the plaintiff’s direct expense but via a contract with third parties (the Deudors), and that the Statute of Frauds likely applied to the oral promise, the ultimate and dispositive ruling was based on the finality of the challenged order due to the late appeal.