G.R. No. L-29380 June 10, 1971
DAMASO RACOMA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MAXIMINA FORTICH, FRANCISCO ALESNA and his wife FLORENCIA LOFRANCO DE ALESNA, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Damaso Racoma filed a complaint for reconveyance and possession of a parcel of land in Sagbayan, Bohol, against defendants-appellees, alleging that defendant Maximina Fortich obtained title to the land through mistake or fraud. The procedural history involved multiple amended complaints. The trial court, in an order dated January 5, 1968, set the case for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and res judicata raised in the defendants’ answer, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. The court considered the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint for this purpose, as a proposed Third Amended Complaint had not been admitted.
The Court of First Instance of Bohol dismissed the complaint. It held that the Second Amended Complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action because it merely alleged “mistake or fraud” in a general, conclusory manner without stating the ultimate facts and circumstances constituting such mistake or fraud with particularity. The court found this failure fatal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order. The Court held that a cause of action was sufficiently alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the allegations were not mere conclusions of law. The complaint defined the plaintiff’s primary right by alleging he was the owner and possessor of the land for about thirty years, had applied for a free patent which was approved by the Director of Lands in 1952, and that the defendant violated this right by including his land in a bigger parcel for which she obtained a certificate of title in 1964. It further alleged the defendants claimed adverse ownership and sought to oust him.
Crucially, the complaint particularized the fraud by stating in paragraph 10 that the plaintiff had no knowledge whatsoever of the defendant’s application for registration or the ensuing decree until February 25, 1967. These allegations, taken together, sufficiently averred a cause of action for reconveyance based on fraud. The Court reiterated the well-settled doctrine that the existence of a decree of registration is no bar to an action for reconveyance, which is an action in personam, provided it is shown the registration was wrongful and the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.