GR L 16844; (June, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16844; June 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REPATRIATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 63. TRINIDAD GUILLERMO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
FACTS
Petitioner Trinidad Guillermo, born in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, was a former Filipino citizen who lost her citizenship by marrying Chinese citizen Ngo Kim Po. Following her husband’s death on November 24, 1959, she filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reacquire her Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Commonwealth Act No. 63. Her petition alleged she had five children with her deceased husband. At the hearing, she presented evidence of her marriage, her husband’s death, and her own former citizenship and Filipino parentage. However, her testimony did not provide any evidence regarding the names, birthdates, or ages of her alleged children.
The lower court granted her petition for repatriation. Its decision contained a factual finding that she had five minor children and, in its dispositive portion, declared that her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship would “operate to Confer Filipino citizenship on her minor children.” The Republic appealed, contesting both the unsupported factual finding and the legal conclusion regarding the automatic conferment of citizenship on the children.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) whether the lower court’s factual finding on the existence and minority of petitioner’s children was supported by evidence, and (2) whether the lower court correctly ruled that the petitioner’s repatriation would automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon her minor children.
RULING
The Supreme Court set aside the challenged portions of the lower court’s decision. On the first issue, the Court found the lower court’s factual finding clearly erroneous. The record contained absolutely no evidence—no testimony, no documents—regarding the names, dates of birth, or ages of petitioner’s children. The only reference was a single answer on cross-examination confirming she lived with her children, which was insufficient to establish their identities or minority.
On the second issue, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on the substantive legal merit of whether repatriation automatically confers citizenship on minor children, as represented by the precedent in Villahermosa v. Commissioner of Immigration. The Court instead based its reversal on procedural grounds. The petitioner’s plea was limited solely to her own repatriation; she did not ask for any judicial declaration regarding her children’s citizenship. By making a pronouncement on an issue not raised in the pleadings, the lower court decided beyond the issues presented and exceeded its jurisdiction. Furthermore, such a pronouncement was devoid of any factual basis, given the complete lack of evidence on the children’s ages or status. The petition for repatriation itself was granted, but the ancillary ruling on the children’s citizenship was annulled.
