G.R. No. L-46394. October 26, 1977.
FABAR, INCORPORATED, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUPERTO RODELAS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Fabar, Incorporated filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Ruperto Rodelas and Apolonio Elevado. The complaint alleged that the defendants purchased three motor vehicles, made a down payment, and executed a promissory note for the balance payable in installments. After defaulting on payments, Fabar invoked the acceleration clause to demand the entire unpaid balance. In their answer, defendants claimed they were merely accommodation parties for the true buyer, Robert Yap, and that Yap had been substituted as the principal debtor with Fabar’s consent—an alleged novation.
The procedural history involved multiple pre-trial settings. After the filing of a third-party complaint by Rodelas against Yap in October 1966, the case saw little activity. In July 1969, the court issued a new pre-trial order setting a conference for September 22, 1969. Rodelas failed to file a pre-trial brief and neither he nor his counsel appeared on that date, leading the trial court to declare him in default. Based on ex-parte evidence, the court rendered a judgment against the defendants. Rodelas later moved to set aside the decision, arguing he received no notice of the September 1969 pre-trial.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the trial court acted correctly in declaring Rodelas in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference and in rendering judgment based on ex-parte evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The legal logic centers on Rodelas’s procedural negligence and waiver of his defense. The record conclusively showed that notice of the pre-trial order dated July 29, 1969, was duly served upon Rodelas’s counsel of record. Service upon counsel is service upon the client. His counsel’s failure to appear, despite notice, justified the order of default under the rules. Rodelas’s claim of lack of personal notice is immaterial and unavailing.
Furthermore, the Court found Rodelas’s substantive defense of novation to be without merit due to his own inaction. He filed a third-party complaint against Robert Yap in 1966 but utterly failed to prosecute it for nearly five years, making no effort to cause summons or pursue the action. This abandonment rendered his claim of substitution dubious and indicative of a dilatory tactic. His prolonged neglect precluded him from objecting to the default order over a year after its issuance. The trial court correctly granted judgment based on the plaintiff’s evidence, which established the debt and the defendants’ default.