G.R. No. L-27013 October 18, 1977
ANGEL MASCUÑANA and ANGELES M. VERDEFLOR, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, LEON T. TREYES, ULPIANA INSON, GONZALO ORDANIEL and FLORENTINO GARGALLANO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners Angel Mascuñana and Angeles M. Verdeflor own lots adjacent to a disputed area near the intersection of Burgos and Rizal Streets in Talisay, Negros Occidental. They claimed this area was a terminus or extension of Burgos Street, a public road, but was occupied by private respondents who constructed houses thereon. In 1962, petitioners requested the municipal mayor to clear these “squatters” to allow public use of the street and to enable Verdeflor to build on her lot. The municipal council, after an ocular inspection, passed Resolution No. 59, declaring the area closed to vehicular traffic as it was deemed not necessary for such use. This resolution was later approved by the Provincial Board via Resolution No. 1035.
The municipal and provincial actions were based on findings that the area was not practically a street—described as a narrow alley leading to a creek—and thus could be treated as municipal patrimonial property. Petitioners filed a petition in the Court of First Instance seeking to declare these resolutions void, arguing the area remained a public street. The trial court dismissed their petition via a minute order, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without a trial on the merits, thereby failing to resolve the legality of the municipal and provincial resolutions that declared a purported public street closed.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for trial on the merits. The Court held that the trial court’s summary dismissal, without adequately addressing the substantive legal issues, was improper. Petitioners sufficiently alleged a cause of action by questioning the validity of the resolutions that closed a purported public street. Their claim that the area was part of Burgos Street, a property for public use, raised significant legal questions regarding its possible illegal closure and the alleged nuisance created by the private occupants.
The legal logic centers on the nature of property for public use and the proper procedure for its withdrawal. Streets are public in nature and cannot be arbitrarily closed without following the legal process under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code, which requires specific steps like indemnifying prejudiced parties. The municipal council’s resolution, based on a finding that the area was not a functional street, attempted to bypass these requirements by reclassifying it as patrimonial. However, petitioners’ allegations and the cadastral map they presented suggested the area was originally part of the street. This factual dispute—whether the land was a public street or had lost that character—necessitates a full trial to examine evidence, including the map and the circumstances of non-use. The Court emphasized that the trial court’s order of dismissal is appealable like a final judgment and should provide reasoning to assist review. The ends of justice required a trial to resolve the legal points, including whether the structures constituted a nuisance under the Civil Code.