GR 207246; (November, 2016) (Digest)
March 13, 2026GR L 14908; (October, 1963) (Digest)
March 13, 2026G.R. No. L-27170. November 22, 1977.
IN RE APPLICATION FOR THE REGISTRATION OF LAND. EUGENE MOSS, through his Administrator, DR. TEODORICO H. JACELDO, applicant-appellant, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS
Eugene Moss, an American citizen, appealed the denial of his application for registration of a ten-hectare island in Carigara Bay, Leyte, known as Calumpihan Island. The Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the application, citing the constitutional prohibition under the 1935 Constitution against aliens acquiring lands, as interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds. The island had been possessed and cultivated since 1894, with a chain of title from Vicente Pragas to Eduardo Cecilio, then to Catalina Pabilion, and later to Rufino Pascual. Moss, together with Albert Boyd Cassidy, both American nationals, purchased the land in January 1945. Moss later became the sole owner by virtue of a 1962 court decision. He declared the land for taxation in 1950, paid realty taxes from 1945 to 1966, and had it surveyed in 1962 before filing his registration application in 1965.
The Solicitor General, representing the oppositor Director of Lands, surprisingly recommended reversal of the trial court’s decision, arguing that Moss was entitled to registration. The core dispute centered on whether Moss, as an American citizen, was constitutionally disqualified from owning land in the Philippines, given his acquisition occurred in 1945 during the Commonwealth period.
ISSUE
Whether an American citizen is constitutionally disqualified from acquiring and registering title to private agricultural land in the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and granted Moss’s application. The legal logic hinges on the specific constitutional and treaty provisions applicable to American citizens during the Commonwealth and post-independence periods. While the 1935 Constitution generally prohibited aliens from acquiring lands, an appended Ordinance—approved pursuant to the Tydings-McDuffie Law (Independence Law)—granted U.S. citizens and corporations the same civil rights as Philippine citizens, including the right to acquire private property. This Ordinance, specifically subsection (17) of Section 1, was part of the fundamental law when Moss purchased the land in 1945.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, did not divest Moss of his property right. The 1935 Constitution itself mandated that existing property rights of U.S. citizens be acknowledged and safeguarded to the same extent as those of Philippine citizens. This constitutional guarantee was implemented by Article VI of the Treaty of General Relations between the Philippines and the United States. Consequently, Moss’s acquisition was valid under the applicable constitutional ordinance, and his vested right was preserved after independence. The Court also noted that Moss and his predecessors had possessed the land en concepto de dueño for over thirty years, satisfying the requirement for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act.
