G.R. No. L-27592 February 14, 1980
ROMANA T. TORRALBA, petitioner, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City), PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, FLORENCIA and LUIS, both surnamed SAN JUAN and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Romana T. Torralba entered into a conditional contract to sell a lot with respondent People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) in 1948. The contract stipulated that default in payment of three monthly installments would result in its automatic annulment, allowing PHHC to repossess and dispose of the property. Torralba defaulted from November 1949. After written notices of cancellation in 1952 and 1954, which she ignored, PHHC filed an action for recovery of possession. Torralba was declared in default for filing her answer late. The court rendered a decision in 1959 ordering her to vacate, pay arrears, rentals, and attorney’s fees.
PHHC moved for execution in 1960, and a writ was served. In 1960, Torralba deposited P1,000 with PHHC. In 1967, PHHC’s Board awarded the lot to respondent Florencia San Juan, executed a deed of sale, and secured a new title. PHHC then moved for an order of demolition, which the respondent judge granted. Torralba sought reconsideration, arguing the judgment could no longer be enforced by mere motion after five years and that her P1,000 payment revived her rights.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of demolition based on a judgment more than five years old, and whether Torralba’s payment of P1,000 revived her contractual rights.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the procedural issue, the Court clarified that while Section 6, Rule 39 states a judgment may be enforced by motion within five years from its finality, the writ of execution in this case was issued and served upon Torralba within that five-year period (the decision became final in 1959, and the writ was served in 1960). Consequently, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. The order of demolition, issued later in 1967, was merely a continuation or incident of that properly initiated execution process, not a new enforcement action barred by the five-year rule.
On the substantive issue, the Court held Torralba’s payment of P1,000 in 1960 did not revive the cancelled contract. The contract provided for revival only if the awardee paid all arrears and interest within ninety days from notice of cancellation. PHHC notified Torralba of cancellation in July 1952. Her payment in 1960 was made well beyond the 90-day period and was for an amount less than the total judgment obligation. Thus, it could not reinstate her status as a bona fide awardee; at most, it was a partial satisfaction of the monetary judgment against her. Furthermore, the contract stipulated automatic annulment upon default, making judicial rescission unnecessary. PHHC was therefore at liberty to award the lot to San Juan. The respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion.