GR L 18262; (March, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18262. March 31, 1962.
LEOPOLDO M. SY-QUIA, MARIA PAZ SY-QUIA, HECTOR MORENO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX ANTONIO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, MARY A. MARSMAN, MARSMAN and CO., INC., AMANDO L. VELILIA, ZOILO ALBERTO, HENRY DOORNBOSCH, and APOLONIO V. SANTIAGO, respondents.
FACTS
On December 28, 1960, petitioners (the Sy-Quia group) filed two injunction suits in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Civil Cases Nos. 6426 and 6427) against Mary A. Marsman and other directors of Marsman Investments, Ltd. The first suit sought to restrain them from presiding over a stockholders’ meeting to confirm a sale of corporate shares to Mary Marsman, alleging her disqualification under English law. The second suit aimed to stop the enforcement of a board resolution suspending the voting rights of the Sy-Quia group’s proxies. The Rizal court granted ex parte preliminary injunctions. Served during the meetings, these writs prevented the respondent directors from presiding, leading to their ouster and the election of petitioners as new directors.
Subsequently, on December 31, 1960, respondents filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case No. 45935) against the Sy-Quia group. The complaint contained three causes of action: to declare valid the sale of shares to Mary Marsman; to nullify the election of petitioners as directors for being illegally convened; and to assail the legality of a board resolution authorizing the removal of corporate records. Respondents prayed for a preliminary injunction. Petitioners moved to dismiss the Manila case on grounds of litis pendentia (pendency of the Rizal cases) and failure to state a cause of action for injunction. Respondent Judge Felix Antonio denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Did the Court of First Instance of Manila commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 45935?
RULING
No, the Manila court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motion to dismiss. On the issue of litis pendentia, the Court found the causes of action in the Manila and Rizal cases were not identical. The Rizal suits primarily concerned the disqualification of Mary Marsman as a director and the suspension of proxy votes to prevent specific corporate meetings. In contrast, the Manila case directly assailed the validity of the share sale to Mary Marsman, the legality of the election that installed the petitioners as directors, and the removal of corporate records—matters not originally pleaded in the Rizal complaints. The Manila court first acquired jurisdiction over these specific subject matters.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Manila CFI properly had jurisdiction over the persons of some defendants who were Manila residents and over the subject matter, which involved the validity of corporate acts and elections. The complaint stated sufficient causes of action warranting a trial on the merits. The denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of an allegedly improper remedy (injunction) is not correctible by certiorari when other substantial issues are raised in the complaint. The petition for prohibition and certiorari was dismissed.
