GR 226679; (August, 2017) (Digest)
G.R. No. 226679 , August 15, 2017
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for possession of 0.084 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride. He filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, seeking to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead plead guilty to the lesser offense of possession of drug paraphernalia under Section 12 of the same law. The prosecution opposed the motion, citing the express prohibition under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 , which states: “Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.”
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), presided by respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo, denied Estipona’s motion. While the RTC recognized the merit in Estipona’s argument that Section 23 encroaches on the Supreme Court’s rule-making power and contradicts the law’s rehabilitative intent, it invoked the doctrine of “becoming modesty” and declined to rule on the constitutional question. Estipona’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, prompting him to file the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition directly challenging the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 .
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 , which prohibits plea bargaining for all violations of the said law, is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution .
RULING
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and declared Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court held that the provision constitutes an invalid encroachment on its exclusive constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure.
The legal logic is anchored on the principle of separation of powers. Under the 1987 Constitution , the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure, fundamentally governed by the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 118 on pre-trial. By absolutely prohibiting plea bargaining in all cases under R.A. No. 9165 , Congress effectively suspended the application of this procedural rule for a specific class of offenses. This legislative act directly contravenes the constitutional delineation of powers. The Court emphasized that while Congress has the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties (substantive law), it cannot dictate the judicial procedure for prosecuting them. Section 23 is a procedural straitjacket that undermines judicial discretion and the efficient administration of justice. The Court further clarified that its ruling does not grant an absolute right to plea bargain but restores the discretion of the courts, in accordance with the Rules, to allow it where appropriate, subject to the consent of the prosecution and the accused.
