G.R. No. L-13929; March 28, 1962
JOSE T. LLOREN, ETC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose T. Lloren, Justice of the Peace of Itogon, Benguet, cited Alan A. Bakewell for contempt after Bakewell interrupted and insulted a witness during a preliminary examination Lloren was conducting within the Baguio Gold Mining Company compound. After Bakewell submitted a written explanation instead of appearing personally, Lloren issued a warrant for his arrest. Bakewell secured a writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio, presided by Judge Jesus de Veyra, which released him from custody. The CFI later rendered a decision making the injunction permanent, finding Lloren committed grave abuse of discretion.
Lloren received the CFI decision on March 18, 1958. He filed a motion for reconsideration on April 2, which was denied on April 14. Lloren received the order of denial on the afternoon of April 16. He immediately notified the clerk of court of his intent to appeal and tendered a cash bond, but the clerk advised him to file formally the next day as office hours had closed. On April 17, Lloren filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond. Judge De Veyra, however, denied the appeal, ruling it was filed one day beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner Lloren perfected his appeal within the 15-day reglementary period prescribed by the Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes, the appeal was perfected on time. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus, ordering the respondent court to give due course to the appeal. The legal logic hinges on the proper computation of periods under Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The 15-day period to appeal commenced from Lloren’s receipt of the decision on March 18. He filed his motion for reconsideration on April 2. Applying Rule 28 (excluding the first day, including the last), April 2 was exactly the 15th day. The filing of that motion suspended the running of the appeal period.
Upon receipt of the denial order on April 16, the remainder of the period—one day—began to run. Applying the same rule, April 16 (the day of receipt) is excluded, making April 17 the last and included day for perfecting the appeal. Therefore, the filing of the notice and bond on April 17 was timely. The Court expressly rejected the mathematical computation method argued by respondents, which would have counted the period from the filing of the motion to its denial as 14 days and deducted it from the total elapsed days, resulting in a finding of tardiness. The Court resolved to adhere strictly to the sequential, day-by-day computation mandated by Rule 28, ensuring fairness and predictability in procedural deadlines.