GR 22635; (October, 1927)

EN BANC

G.R. No. 22635; October 29, 1927

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, petitioner,

vs.
THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA and THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondents.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for petitioner.
Jose C. Abreu for respondents.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari, with a view to set aside a decision of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga in regard to lots Nos. 678, 679, 683, and 684 in cadastral case No. 6 of the province, on the ground that said lots constitute a part of the Camp Stotsenburg military reservation, and that the lower court had no jurisdiction to order their registration in cadastral proceedings instituted subsequently to the establishment of the reservation.

It appears from the record that under the provisions of Act. No. 627 reservation proceedings Nos. 10 and 42 of the now defunct Court of Land Registration were instituted pursuant to executive orders dated August 7, 1903, and August 5, 1908, for the purpose of reserving for military uses a tract of land now known a the Camp Stotsenburg military reservation, and that on August 10, 1903, and August 10, 1908, orders were entered and published by the Court of Land Registration notifying all persons who had claims to any part of the tract to present them for registration within the period prescribed by law and that failing to do so their claims would be forever barred. As far as the record shows the proceedings were regular, the notices required by law were duly published and served, and on June 15, 1914, the Court of Land Registration issued an order declaring that it appeared from the records that the proceedings had been carried out in conformity with the law; that the time for presenting claims had long since expired, and that further claims were forever barred. No claim was presented by the Manila Railroad Company in the preservation proceedings.

Cadastral case No. 6 was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on September 10, 1917, and the lots hereinbefore mentioned were inadvertently included in that case. The Manila Railroad Company filed answers claiming the lots, and no other claims to the lots having been presented, the trial court on April 29, 1919, ordered their registration in the name of the company. The matter was allowed to rest until May 2, 1923, when the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Commanding General of the United States Army, Division of the Philippines filed a motion in the aforesaid Court of First Instance in which he called attention to the fact that a portion of Camp Stotsenburg military reservation had erroneously been adjudged to the Manila Railroad Company and asked that the decision of the court to that effect be modified and corrected. This motion was denied in an order dated August 20, 1924, on the ground that it had been presented too late and that the court had lost its jurisdiction over the matter.

On July 12, 1926, the present action was brought, the petition alleging most of the facts hereinbefore stated, and praying that a writ of certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga issue, ordering that court to certify and forward to this court the record of the proceedings in cadastral case No. 6, in so far as they relate to lots Nos. 678, 679, 683, and 684, for review and that upon which review the decision dated April 29, 1919, and subsequent orders entered in pursuance thereof by respondent court, be set aside and declared null and void.

In their answer the respondents, in substance allege: 1awph!l.net

(1) That the petition does not disclose that the respondent court was without jurisdiction in rendering the decisions which is the subject- matter of the controversy; (2) that the respondent Manila Railroad Company was in visible possession of the land in question at the time military reservation cases Nos. 10 and 42 were instituted and pending, but that, nevertheless, said respondent company was not served with a copy in the Spanish language of the notice issued by the Court of Land Registration, requiring the presentation of private claims in said military reservation proceedings and that, therefore, the claim of said respondent company is not barred by the termination of said proceedings; (3) that the petitioner had a plain and speedy remedy by appeal from the decision in question and that, therefore, certiorari will not lie; (4) that the petitioner is guilty of laches in not having availed itself of the remedy of appeal, or, in not, having sought relief under section 113 of Act No. 190, or by a petition under section 38 of the Act No. 496 for a review of the decree issued in favor of the respondent company within one year after entry thereof; and (5) that certificates of title having been issued in its favor, the respondent company has now an absolute and indefeasible title to the aforesaid lots Nos. 678, 679, 683 and 684, conclusive upon and against the whole world including the petitioner.

The defendant’s contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and section 1 of that Act provides that “all lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands, or any interest therein, within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act . . . .”

This provision appears to have been duly complied with in the Camp Stotsenburg reservation proceedings. Upon the expiration of the term fixed in section 4 of the Act No. 627 for the presentation of private claims to lands within the limits of the reservation, and after the termination of the registration of the lands so claimed, the titles to all lands within the limits of the reservation were definitely settles. The purpose of the enactment of the Cadastral Act is to provide a proceedings for settling and adjudicating land titles, and the jurisdiction of the courts in such proceedings is limited to the carrying our of the purpose of the act and does not extend to the readjudication of titles already settled by previous proceedings of a similar character. This point is more fully discussed in our decision of the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin (43 Phil., 558), and what is there said applies with equal force to the present case.

The assertion of the respondents that the Railroad Company, at the time of the institution of the reservation proceedings, was in visible possession of the lots in dispute and therefore entitled to personal service of the notice issued by the Court of Land Registration, is not supported by any evidence; the mere allegation thereof in the respondents verified answer is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the regularity of the reservation proceedings and the force of the affidavits of the deputy sheriffs charged with the service of the notices, which affidavits are attached to the record and presented in evidence in the present case. It follows that, as far as the record shows, the Railroad Company was not entitled to personal service of the aforesaid notice, but only to service, by publication in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 627.

The respondents also argue that the petitioner having had a plain and speedy remedy by appeal from the decision in the cadastral case, and having failed to avail itself thereof, is not now in position to apply for a writ of certiorari. Ordinarily that would be true; the rule is that the writ will not issue when the petitioner has had an adequate remedy by appeal and has lost it through his own negligence, but this rule does not apply when the right of appeal is lost through no fault of the petitioner. (Boynton vs. Nelson, 46 Ala., 501; Burgett vs. Apperson, 52 Ark., 213; Skinner vs. Maxwell, 67 N. C., 257; Copeland vs. Cox, 5 Heisk. [Tenn.] 172; Evans vs. Christian, 4 Or., 375, in connection with Schirott & Groner vs. Philippine & Coleman, 3 Or., 484.) To hold otherwise would, indeed, amount to a denial of justice. As the laches of its officers is not imputable to the United States Government, it seems obvious that the rule may not be invoked where the action is brought by the Government for the protection of public interest. That is the case here; the Government of the United States is the petitioner and it prosecutes the action on its own behalf and not in the interest of private parties.

The contention that the petitioner was guilty of laches in not taking timely advantage of the various other remedies available may be best answered by quoting the language of Supreme Court of the United States in the case of United States vs. Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Company, 142 U. S., 510: (citing U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad Company, 118 U. S., 120; U. S. vs. Insley, 130 U. S., 263); “When the government is the real party in interest and is proceeding simply to assert its own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitations.”

The respondents contention that certificates of title having been issued in its favor for the land in question the respondent company has an indefeasible title to the lots, is also without merit. If, as we have seen, the respondent court had no company has an indefeasible title to the lots, is also without merit. If, as we have seen, the respondent court had no jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands located within the reservation it follows that the certificates of title issued in pursuance of such an order are null and void.

For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in cadastral case No. 6 of that province is hereby declared null and void in so far as it relates to lots Nos. 678, 679, 683, and 684 of said case, and all orders and final decrees entered in said cadastral case in relation to said lots are likewise declared null and void.

It is further ordered that the certificates of title for said lots, issued in favor of the respondent Rail Road Company, be surrendered to the register of deeds of Pampanga for cancellation upon the corresponding petition to the Court of First Instance, filed in the aforesaid cadastral case in accordance with the provisions of section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). Without costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Batas Pinas