GR L 12375; (August, 1918)

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12375; August 30, 1918

DY KIU, deceased. DY CAY, administrator of the estate of DY KIU, deceased, appellant,

vs.
CROSSFIELD & O’BRIEN, appellees.

Chas. E. Tenney for appellant.
The appellees in their own behalf.

MALCOLM, J.:

Two questions are submitted for resolution by this appeal, namely: (1) Whether section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2347, relating to new trials, should be construed as fixing a time limit within which a judge of first instance can set aside a judgment and grant a new trial; and (2) whether the law firm of Crossfield & O’Brien should be paid for their professional services in certain intestate proceedings on a quantum meruit basis or on the basis of the terms of the contract with their client.

A Chinaman by the name of Dy Cay was appointed administrator of the estate of the Chinaman Dy Kiu, deceased. The administrator desired to prosecute an action against the firm of Dy Buncio & Co. for the liquidation of the partnership business in which the deceased had been interested. To initiate and push the necessary legal proceedings, the administrator, apparently under authority from the court, entered into a contract with Attorneys Crossfield & O’Brien of the following tenor:

Whereas Attorney C. W. O’Brien had been acting as counsel in the case of Dy Kiu, deceased, and filed a petition for the administration of the latter’s estate, and still has to obtain the appointment of a guardian and make arrangements for the administration of the accounts which said deceased had in the business of the firm Dy Buncio and Company: Therefore, we do hereby obligate and bind ourselves to pay, for the service already rendered and for the services which in the future shall be rendered by Attorneys Crossfield & O’Brien, ten per centum (10%) of the sum that may be collected from said company. It is understood that all this shall be in consideration of the services rendered in the Court of First Instance and in the Supreme Court, at Manila, Philippine Islands, and, should it be necessary to go outside of Manila, the parties shall be governed by another agreement.

In witness whereof, this agreement is signed by the widow, in his behalf and in that of his children, by the judicial administrator, and by attorney C. W. O’Brien, for Crossfield & O’Brien, this 10th day of June, 1915, in Manila, P.I.

Signed in the presence of:

(Signed) JOSE S. Y. PENG.

(Signed) FRANCISCO GUINA.

During the pendency of the action for dissolution of the partnership, the interested attorneys entered into the following

STIPULATION:

It is hereby agreed and stipulated by and between the parties hereto, by their respective attorneys, that Mr. John T. Macleod be the liquidator to determine the respective interests of Dy Buncio, the Estate of Dy Kiu, and the Estate of Dy Laco, in the business of Dy Buncio & Company, of Manila, Philippine Islands, and the interests of said company in other partnerships in the provinces, and that Carlos P. Tan Guien Lay shall assist him as the representative of Dy Buncio, and shall furnish him such data and information as he may require, and that Dy Cay, the administrator of the Estate of Dy Kiu, shall assist him in representation of said estate in a similar capacity, and Yap Cha shall act in a similar capacity for Dy Sui, the heir of Dy Laco; that Mr. Macleod shall be furnished all information, books and accounts of whatever nature or description that pertain to said business and its branches, and any of the parties shall have free access to the same in order to properly arrive at the respective values of the different partners’ interests.

And it is expressly stipulated and agreed that each of the parties hereto shall be bound by the findings and the value placed upon their respective interest by the said John T. Macleod, and that in case the said Dy Buncio does not wish to purchase the interests of the above-mentioned estate of Dy Kiu at the value placed upon same by the said John T. Macleod, then the business shall be immediately liquidated in accordance with the terms of the Article of Co-partnership, dated May 2, 1908, and the proceeds thereof divided among the three partners Dy Buncio, Dy Laco and Dy Kiu, or their successors, in proportion to the value of their respective interests as determined by the said liquidator.

In case said Dy Buncio desires to purchase the interests of the estate of Dy Kiu, he shall be allowed to pay the purchase price partly in cash and the balance in installments, the terms and conditions of which shall be then agreed upon.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands, this 10th day of June 1915, at Manila, P.I.

In pursuance of this stipulation, Macleod examined all the books and papers of Dy Buncio & Co. and made a report showing that the share of Dy Kiu in the business was P40,636.85. Dy Cay, the administrator of the estate of Dy Kiu, then objected to the stipulation claiming that he had not authorized it. After setting forth these facts, in a letter of December 10, 1915, the administrator asked Crossfield & O’Brien to withdraw as his attorneys in the case. For the same purpose, the administrator, on February 16, 1916, filed a motion praying that it be made to appear of record that he was no longer represented by Attorneys Crossfield & O’Brien. This firm field their opposition to the motion. On March 14, 1916, the court issued an order to the effect that, upon the determination of the amount of the fees of these attorneys, they cease to represent the administrator in the proceedings. In conformity with this order and after evidence had been taken, the Honorable Jose Abreu, sitting as judge of first instance, rendered a decision on March 31, 1916, fixing the fees due Crossfield & O’Brien on a quantum meruit at P2,000. The administrator excepted to the court’s decision. Attorneys Crossfield & O’Brien also excepted to the decision on April 10, 1916, and moved the court “for a rehearing and modification of the same, for the reason that the court erred in holding that the agreement entered into between the administrator and them as attorneys could not be taken as the basis for payment as it had already been shown that there is more than P40,000 coming to the estate from the source governed by this agreement . . . .” On August 17, 1916, the Honorable James Ostrand, sitting as judge of first instance, promulgated an order revoking the order of March 31, 1916, and fixing the fees of Crossfield & O’Brien, in accordance with their contract with the administrator of the state, at 10 per cent of the amount of P40,636.85 or P4,063.68, which sum the administrator was directed to pay the attorneys out of any available funds pertaining to the estate of Dy Kiu. The court mentioned in this order that as the contract between the administrator and Attorneys Crossfield & O’Brien was fair and equitable, and binding upon the parties, the full fee provided for in said contract should be allowed. The court also remarked that “after further consideration, Judge Abreu in conversation with the undersigned express his conformity with this view.” The administrator appeals from this last order of the court.

1. Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2347, construed. ? The first assignment of error reads: “The court erred in its order dated August 17, 1916, in revoking, setting aside, and modifying the order of March 31, 1916, after the time had elapsed in which the court had jurisdiction to revoke, set aside or modify said order of March 31, 1916.”

The Code of Civil Procedure, as originally enacted, provided in section 145 for new trials “at any time during the term at which an action has been tried in the Court of First Instance . . . .” This section has been superseded since July 1, 1914, by Act No. 2347 providing that: “Within thirty days after notice of a decision rendered by a Court of First Instance, the judge thereof may, at the petition of the party aggrieved, and after due notice to the adverse party, set aside the judgment and grant a new trial,” for any of three specified causes. Crossfield & O’Brien’s motion of April 10, 1916, for a rehearing and a modification of the first decision must be taken as a petition to “set aside the judgment and grant a new trial,” as these words are used in code section 145, as amended. The precise question is, therefore, whether, or a motion made in time, a judgment, setting aside a former judgment but not filed for more than four months after notice of the first judgment, is valid.

Either view we take of this question forces us on to the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the Legislature can constitutionally enact a statute of limitations for motions for a new trial. Rehearing or new trials are not essential to due process of law. (James vs. Appel [1904], 192 U. S., 129.) Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which court were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. “If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chameleon may change its hues, then litigation might become more intolerable then the wrongs it is intended to redress.” (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson [1911], 18 Phil., 257.)

On the other hand, the right of a defeated party to have an error in a judgment corrected should not be taken away from him by a mere delay on the part of the judge in deciding the motion, a delay for which the defeated party would in no way be responsible. (See Santos vs. Villafuerte [1906], 5 Phil., 739.) The time during which a court considers a motion to set aside a judgment or for a new trial should not be counted in determining the statutory period. To say that all motions of this character must be decided within thirty days after notice of a decision, regardless of their importance or difficulty, or of the time of submission, would be subversive of justice. If the provision of law is to be held rigid and mandatory, the effect will be to require many motions to be decided without due consideration, a result which will defeat the spirit of the code. (See Gomer vs. Chaffe [1880], 5 Colo., 383.) Actually applying these views to our present facts, since the motion was presented in time, the court even after the expiration of the thirty day period had jurisdiction to consider the motion and to modify or set aside its judgment.

What is said in the preceding paragraph is more truly indicative of the attitude of this court than of the writer. The court in construing certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure has displayed a willingness to permit of an extension of time, if the motion for such extension is presented before the code limit expires. (See, among other decisions, Lavitoria vs. Judge of First Instance of Tayabas and Director of Lands [1915], 32 Phil., 204; Lim vs. Singian and Soler [1918], 37 Phil., 817.) In about the only decision of a contrary spirit (Biunas vs. Mora [1916], 34 Phil., 282), the words used are said to be obiter dicta.

Parenthetically, it may be remarked, that the shock done to the feelings of the writer, through the failure of the judiciary to assist in the legislative reformation of the modus operandi of the courts in order that justice may be truly expedited, is partially mitigated by a realization that judges possess no inherent right to enter new judgments for an indefinite period after the entry of the original judgment. No unlicensed jurisdiction, untrammelled by observance of the mandate of the law, vests in the judiciary. If a judge fails to act within a reasonable period after the filing of a timely and proper motion to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial, and after the thirty days named by the law have expired, his silence must be taken as tantamount to a denial of justice; mandamus would undoubtedly lie, not to interfere with the exercise of his judicial discretion, but to compel him to exercise his discretion.

2. Compensation of Attorneys. ? The second and third assignments of error assail the action of the Court in allowing Crossfield & O’Brien the full amount provided for in the contract, as attorney’s fees.

The contract executed by the administrator and Attorneys Crossfield & O’Brien was valid and reasonable. The attorneys, having performed the task assigned to them, should receive the payment expressly authorized.

The order of the Court of First Instance of August 17, 1916, is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Carson, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not sit in the case.

Batas Pinas