GR L 10747; (August, 1915)

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10747 ; August 17, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS MACALINGAG (alias Bayao ni Price), defendant-appellant.

Perfecto J. Salas Rodriguez for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On August 21, 1914, the lieutenant of police of the pueblo of Burauen, Island of Leyte, filed a sworn complaint in writing in the justice of the peace of the court of said pueblo, charging Luis Macalingag, alias Bayao ni Price (Price’s brother-in-law), with a violation of Act No. 2159 in that on the 14th day of said month, at a time when he was driving an automobile within the jurisdiction of the said pueblo and on the public highway, he did willfully, criminally, and maliciously run into the automobile of the La Union Company which was proceeding along the same highway; that as a consequence of the collision the automobile of the La Union Company fell with all its passengers over a declivity on the left side of the highway; and that after the accident thus resulting from the movement of his automobile the defendant did not stop to render the assistance asked by the passengers of the automobile struck, but, on the contrary, increased the speed of the automobile he was driving.

When the complaint was heard on August 21, 1914, the demurrer thereto was sustained and it was ordered that the complaint be immediately amended, and, as the justice had ordered this verbally, he repeated his order in writing on the 29th of the same month, whereupon an amended complaint or information was filed by the chief of police, Ricardo Ortiz; but counsel for the defendant moved the court to dismiss the case, to cancel the bond filed, and to assess the costs de oficio, under the provisions of section 23 of General Orders, No. 58, which provides that an order like that of August 21, sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the case with the costs de oficio, without ordering a new complaint or information to be filed, bars a new prosecution for the same offense. In view of the argument of counsel for the defense and the principle laid down in the case of Julia vs. Sotto (2 Phil. Rep., 247), and on the further ground that the verbal order ratified by the written order of August 29 could not in the opinion of the justice of the peace be interpreted as being the prior authorization required by the law for the filing of a new complaint or for destroying the defendant’s right already in existence, the justice finally dismissed the case by an order dated September 11, with the costs de oficio and so forth. From this order for the prosecution appealed.

When the case came up for the trial in the Court of First Instance the judge under date of January 6 of this year set aside the order of the justice of the peace of Burauen dismissing the complaint, and directed that the case be returned to the said justice for further proceedings in accordance with the judgment, without special finding as to costs. Counsel for the defendant appealed from this ruling.

The record shows the fact to have been duly proven that in sustaining the demurrer filed by the defendant and in dismissing the complaint, the justice of the peace verbally directed that the said complaint be amended, a verbal direction which was ratified by the justice in his order of August 29, 1914; and therefore after such ratification the same justice could not grant the motion of the defendant to dismiss the amended complaint, especially when in view of said complaint he was obliged by law to render a decision.

The order of August 21, 1914, could have been legally amended or supplemented by another of the 29th of the same month by a certain special provision which the justice of the peace had through negligence or carelessness failed to put down in writing in said first order, because it had not yet become final nor had it been appealed from by the prosecution, and therefore the justice of the peace still had the power to make it; and it is neither just nor legal that the omission of an important detail that ought to have been entered in an order of the court should by reason of negligence, ignorance or carelessness of a justice of the peace work exemption from the consequences of a criminal act.

Since counsel for the appellant has raised no question as to the validity or constitutionality of Act No. 2159, with violation of which the defendant is charged, an appeal in third instance does not lie, and so the appeal filed by him from the judgment of January 6 last is improper, said judgment being, moreover, in accordance with the law and the merits of the case.

The appeal filed from said judgment is dismissed and the case will be returned with a copy of this decision to the Court of First Instance, so that in accordance with the provisions of his said judgment he may take proper action in accordance with law. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson and Trent, JJ., concur in the result on the ground that the appeal in third instance does not lie.

Batas Pinas